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The Issue 
In a context of internationalisation and concentration, bio-foods co-operatives often face 
problems of capital access and governance. According to Spear (2001), limited access to 
capital, management structure, governance conflicts, and the local, regional or national 
focus of co-operatives limit their expansion. Recent events in Canada, such as Agricore 
going  public  and  Dairyworld  being  absorbed  by  a  corporation,  have  reinforced  this 
perception (Thibault and Dupuis, 2003). In this evolving competitive environment, the 
traditional  co-operative  model  cannot  thrive  and  succeed  if  static.  New  hybrid  co-
operative models are emerging, and an analysis of these models should contribute to an 
understanding of the trade-off between co-operative values and other attributes necessary 
for survival in an increasingly competitive environment. 
Implications and Conclusions 
Three non-traditional co-operative structures are discussed in this article. Co-op public 
limited companies (PLCs) can be quite successful in creating value for members and in 
solving  capital  access  problems.  The  co-operative,  which  owns  shares  of  the  limited 
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company, can still operate according to co-operative principles; it does however face the 
risk of being marginalized and acting more like a rent receiver than a co-op. The new 
generation  co-op  (NGC)  is  based  on  strong  co-operative  values  but  has  a  closed 
membership. Such a structure can be successful in maintaining co-operative values for 
members and at the same time can improve capital access through its member capital 
requirement. However, this structure often falls victim to its own success, resulting in the 
conversion of the NGC into a publicly owned company. Reasons for such a conversion 
include incentives for members to act like brokers, the aging of the membership and the 
difficulty in recruiting new members given the significant capital requirement combined 
with  a  governance  structure  that  still  has  the  shortcomings  of  traditional  co-ops.  The 
hybrid structure, as exemplified by the New Zealand dairy co-operative Fonterra, is an 
interesting  mix  of  traditional,  NGC  and  private  company  structures  in  terms  of 
governance and capital. This type of structure is fairly new, and it seems to avoid the 
shortcomings of NGCs and co-op PLCs while improving capital access and governance. 
Canadian policy makers should pay attention to these evolving models and ensure that 
Canadian  co-operative  legislation  is  competitive  with  other  countries  and  does  not 
constrain the emergence of hybrid structures. 
Background 
The increasing concentration of food distributors, the internationalization of food markets 
and new entrants into domestic markets have increased the capital requirements of co-
operatives and challenged their governance structure (Doyon, 2001). At the same time, in 
the wake of financial scandals, foreign acquisitions and rural area impoverishment, the 
need is greater than ever for stable structures, both regional and national in scope, that 
perform well economically and are oriented toward the users and toward the community.  
This  need  demonstrates  the  appeal  of  co-operatives,  which  are  more  than  profit 
maximizing  entities.  In  this  context,  emerging  co-operative  models  such  as  publicly 
limited companies, new generation co-operatives and hybrid models are analysed in terms 
of  trade-offs  between  co-operative  values  or  principles  and  profit  maximizing 
performance.  In  particular,  the  focus  of  this  article  will  be  on  their  competitive 
performance, access to capital and governance. 
Conceptual Framework 
The relationship between the competitive environment and co-operatives can be explained 
by  the  competitive  environment–strategy–structure  matching  framework  illustrated  in 
figure 1.  
Organizational contingency theory suggests that strategy and structure should fit the 
environment and that firms have a reactive role. On the other hand, theories of strategic 
management present firms as pro-active, looking for the best fit between the competitive 
environment and the organisational structure (Westgren, 1994). The matching framework Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon 
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illustrated  in  figure  1  is  derived  from  strategic  management  and  organization  theory 
literature and  “views organization performance  as a  function of the  match  among the 
characteristics of the organization’s environment, strategies and structures” (Baltazar and 
Brooks, 2001, 3). Supporters of this approach argue that the greater the fit, the greater the 
performance. 
It  appears  that  co-operatives  have  modified  their  structures  and  their  selected 
strategies to respond to internal and external pressures, to facilitate access to capital, and 
to  put  themselves  in  a  position  that  enables  them  to  implement  desired  strategies. 
According to Van Bekkum et al. (1997) as cited by Thibault and Dupuis (2003): 
For  the  majority  of  current  co-operatives,  it  is  right  to  say  that  their 
current  structure  is  not  optimal  given  their  commercial  environment. 
However, it is difficult to assess what would be the optimal model. A best 
and universal co-operative model does not exist – it all depends on the 
specific  conditions  under  which  a  co-operative  operates.  In  fact, 
numerous ways to structure a co-operative exist. 
Fulton  and  Gibbings  (2000)  have  identified  common  structural  characteristics  for 
success including the following: 
•  regardless of size, successful co-operatives tend to deliver substantial and 





















Figure 1.   Relationship between the competitive environment, strategic management 
decision and structure 
 
Sources : Baltazar and Brooks, 2001; Daft, 1998 and Aaker, 1992. 
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Figure 1  Relationship between the competitive environment, strategic management 
decisions and structure. 
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•  regardless  of  size,  successful  co-operatives  tend  to  have  a  homogeneous 
membership. 
In  this  article,  the  relationship  among  environment,  strategy  and  structure  of  co-
operatives  is  used  to  explore  co-operative  models  in  terms  of  trade-offs  between  co-
operative principles
1 and the economic competitive imperative in relation to capital access 
and governance. 
Analysis 
Apart from the traditional marketing or input co-operative model, as defined by Goddard 
(2002),  three  general  models  have  been  identified  for  discussion  purposes:  the  co-
operative  holding  model,  the  new  generation  co-op  and  the  hybrid  model.  The  co-
operative holding model is broadly defined as a participative organization (co-operative) 
that takes, in part or entirely, possession of a capital structure. This would cover the public 
limited company, where the co-operative owns publicly traded shares of its own assets, as 
well as traditional co-operatives that share ownership of assets with private companies.
2 
The Kerry Group PLC is the co-operative used here to illustrate this model. The new 
generation co-op is characterized by a closed membership, significant capital contribution 
from members and the obligation to deliver according to the number of shares owned. 
Dakota  Growers  Pasta  Company  is  the  co-operative  used  to  discuss  this  model.  The 
hybrid model contains characteristics of both co-operatives and private or publicly held 
firms. Fonterra is the organization used to illustrate this model. 
Public Limited Company Co-op 
In the early 1980s, Irish dairy co-operatives were poorly capitalized; their small capital 
base  had  been  eroded  by  years  of  high  inflation  and  they  had  to  rely  on  short-term 
borrowing.  This  borrowing  resulted  in  little  advantage  for  co-op  members,  the  co-op 
being unable to deliver higher than average milk prices or significant patronage dividends 
(Pitts, 2001). Moreover, Garoyan (1991) suggested that Irish co-ops lacked adherence in 
practice to true co-operative principles while Harte (1994) argued that at the same time 
there was recognition of the limitation of co-operatives as an organisational form. It was 
in this context that Kerry Coop created Kerry Group PLC in 1986. Kerry Coop traded its 
assets for 90 million non-tradable shares (type B), while 60 million tradable type A shares 
were  sold  on  the  stock  market.  Thus,  the  co-op  had  a  60  percent  ownership  of  the 
company. Moreover, type A shares were first offered at a reduced price to co-op members 
and staff. 
One can argue that subsequent to this change of structure co-operative principles and 
values have been preserved. Kerry Coop is still organized as a traditional co-op with a 
usage link based on delivery of milk. Members have one co-op share for each 1,000 kg of 
milk delivered to the co-op and then sold to Kerry Group. The change of structure has 
solved the co-op’s under-capitalization problem, as the organization receives dividends Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon 
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and capital gains from its ownership of Kerry Group. The dividends can be distributed to 
members  as  patronage  dividends.  In  addition,  the  co-op  is  able  to  deliver  substantial 
advantages to its members by offering a better than average milk price to its members 
(O’Connor  and  Thompson,  2001).  In  terms  of  governance,  the  Kerry  Coop  is  still 
organized  on  the  basis  of  one  member,  one  vote,  and  the  board  of  directors  is 
democratically elected from among co-op members. The co-op board of directors is then 
entitled to a say on the board of directors of Kerry Group, given the co-op’s significant 
share of Kerry Group’s ownership. At the same time, Kerry Group has the governance 
structure of a publicly owned company, which, according to Abdill (2000), offers more 
flexibility and efficiency than a traditional co-op board of directors offers. 
Kerry  Group has been very successful, sales have increased  from €268 million in 
1982 to €3.7 billion in 2003. The company has a presence in 120 countries and employs 
20,000 people. Shares were initially released in 1986 at €0.66, and in May 2004 they 
traded at €16.25. The Kerry Group has always paid dividends to stockholders.  
Although the Kerry Group was initially a dairy co-operative, dairy products today 
represent  only  10  percent  of  the  company’s  revenues.  Pressure  to  increase  access  to 
capital has led Kerry Coop to reduce its share in Kerry Group over the years. In 2003, 
Kerry  Coop’s  share  of  Kerry  Group  was  31  percent,  down  from  60  percent  in  1986. 
However,  it  is  estimated  that  today  dairy  farmers  own  roughly  20  percent  of  type  A 
shares. Events have also shown that conflict can occur in more difficult times, such as 
when  shares  on  the  stock  market  do  not  perform  well.  According  to  Pitts  (2001), 
institutional shareholders could see that the necessity to maintain a relatively high milk 
price paid to co-op farmers was the predominant reason for the lack of profitability of 
their company. This conflict is reduced where milk suppliers have subscribed extra capital 
and themselves benefit from increased prices. At present, Kerry Group does not have this 
problem since milk processing is a relatively unimportant part of its total operations and 
high milk prices can be subsidised from their other operations.  
Kerry Coop’s capital access problem has been solved and governance has improved 
with the co-op board of directors also having a say on the company board of directors. Co-
operative values such as services to members, usage link and one member, one vote have 
also been preserved. However, one might question the soul of the co-operative, which 
might appear to be more like a rent receiver than an active co-op. The co-op PLC model 
appears to be an interesting solution in cases where, in the  words of  Garoyan (1991, 
1293), “there is a lack of adherence in practice to true co-operative principles”, or, as 
mentioned by Fulton and Gibbings (2000), the co-operative does not deliver substantial 
and immediate advantages to its members. 
New Generation Co-op 
Dakota Growers Pasta is a new generation co-op (NGC). The differences between a NGC 
and  a  traditional  co-op  are  closed  membership,  the  requirement  of  a  large  capital Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon 
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contribution for entrance and a strong obligation to supply (use) predetermined quantities 
of products (services). As with traditional co-operatives, the one member, one vote rule 
applies, as well as the rule on election and composition of the board of directors. NGCs 
are usually marketing co-ops with strong processing components. 
At  the  end  of  the  1980s,  the  economic  future  for  North  Dakota  durum  wheat 
producers was not bright. Prices were below cost of production, most of the wheat was 
being processed out of state and unemployment was running high in rural areas. It was in 
this environment that the NGC  Dakota  Growers  Pasta Company (DGPC)  was created 
(Boland and Barton, 2002). The business plan was for a processing plant of three million 
bushels capacity,  with 35 percent of the necessary equity for the project being raised 
among roughly 1,000 producers. 
Each $3.85 invested by producers gave them a delivery share, which is an obligation 
to supply one bushel of No. 1 hard amber U.S. durum wheat per year. Shares can be 
negotiated in private, but the transaction requires the approval of the board of directors. 
The  number  of  delivery  shares  sold  is  equal  to  the processing  capacity  of  the  co-op. 
Moreover, to become a member of the co-op, one has to buy a voting share for $125. One 
member can only have one voting share, as the shares are neither tradable nor refundable. 
Demand for DGPC products grew, so the co-operative expanded its membership and 
the number of delivery shares in 1996 as well as in 1999. In 1999, current members could 
buy delivery shares for $7.50 while new members paid $11. 
DGPC  was successful and well capitalized and respected the co-operative identity 
regarding the usage link, patronage dividend based on delivery shares, and one member, 
one  vote;  as  well,  the  co-operative  was  able  to  deliver  substantial  and  immediate 
advantages to its members. Members received a higher than average price for their wheat, 
received patronage dividends, saw an increase in the value of their delivery shares and 
benefited  from  technical  services  for  wheat  production.  The  co-op  also  became  an 
important employer for the rural community of Carrington, ND and helped the community 
to  prosper  during  a  time  period  when  most  rural  communities  in  Dakota  were  facing 
financial hardships. 
However, at the end of the 1990s, the pasta market changed drastically. DGPC at that 
time was the third largest pasta processor in North America following its acquisition of 
Prima  Piatta  Inc.  in  1998.  New  market  entrants,  including  some  multinational  firms, 
created an oversupply, and prices were reduced by 20 percent from 1998 to 2003, while 
the price of durum wheat increased by 23 percent over the same period. Concurrently, the 
demand  for  pasta  in  the  United  States  was  greatly  reduced  due  to  popular  low-
carbohydrate regimes such as the Atkins diet.  
In such a context, it appeared that research and innovations to develop value-added 
products (such as tasty low-carbohydrate pasta), which would have required significant 
capital expenditures, was the only route for DGPC. However, it appeared that members 
were not willing to reinvest massively in the co-op for the following reasons: Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon 
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•  numerous producers had trouble meeting the quality required for delivery 
shares because of wheat scab disease and bad weather, forcing them to buy 
wheat elsewhere, thus greatly reducing their profits; 
•  the co-op did not pay patronage dividends in 2001 and 2002; and 
•  agriculture revenues were low in general. 
Based on these factors, the members voted in May 2003 to convert the co-op into a 
publicly traded company.
3 The reasons given for the conversion were the significant need 
for capital and the co-operative structure, which was not judged flexible enough to allow 
for timely strategic management decisions. According to Hazen (chief executive of the 
U.S. Co-operative Business Association), other reasons were also at work, such as the 
desire from members and management to unlock important intangible values, including 
values associated with brand name. Also important was the fact that hundreds of members 
were no longer wheat producers and were acting like brokers, buying from durum farmers 
and reselling to the co-op at profit. This behaviour created heterogeneity among the co-op 
membership, which, as pointed out by Fulton and Gibbings (2000), can lead to problems 
for a co-op since broker members do not share the same needs and values as the producer 
members. Moreover, numerous members were approaching retirement, meaning that new 
buyers willing to accept the delivery obligation would need to be found. 
The NGC format reflects all the traditional co-op values and principles except for 
open membership. NGCs have better access to capital than traditional co-ops, given the 
significant  capital  required  of  members,  and  are  generally  successful  in  creating 
substantial  and  immediate  advantages  for  their  members.  However,  the  NGC  formula 
does not offer advantages in terms of governance, and the close membership link and the 
delivery  obligation  can  create  long-term  problems.  The  obligation  can  encourage 
members to adopt broker-type behaviour, making the transition from one generation of 
farmers to another difficult and creating an incentive to convert the co-op into a publicly 
traded company, as illustrated by DGPC. 
Hybrid Model 
Following  external  pressures  from  World  Trade  Organisation  partners  regarding  state 
trading enterprises such as the New Zealand  Dairy Board (NZDB) as well as internal 
pressures such as inter-co-operative competition, in 2001 the NZDB was dismantled and 
the major New Zealand dairy co-operatives merged to create Fonterra. The co-operative 
Fonterra processes 98 percent of New Zealand milk, has a presence in 140 countries and 
accounts for roughly 7 percent of New Zealand’s GDP. In terms of capital structure and 
governance, this co-op has characteristics that make it a blend of co-operative and private 
company. 
At the governance level, for polls or postal ballots, Fonterra’s members have one vote 
for each 1,000 kg of milk of milk solids delivered.
4 This is a departure from the one 
member, one vote rule and is similar to the voting rules of publicly owned companies. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon 
 
 
      19 
However, votes during meetings follow the one member, one vote rule. The board of 
directors consists of nine elected members, according to co-operative principles, but also 
includes  four  external  members  nominated  by  the  board  of  directors.  The  external 
members  might help mitigate some of the criticism of co-op boards of directors  with 
respect to their lack of business management knowledge relative to similarly sized private 
or  publicly  own  companies  (Abdill,  2000).  The  governance  structure  of  Fonterra 
(figure 2) also includes a shareholders council that is made up of elected members and 
acts as a watchdog to ensure that the board of directors respects the co-operative nature of 
Fonterra.  In  addition,  a  milk  commissioner  acts  as  a  referee  in  the  case  of  a  dispute 
between Fonterra and its members. 
The capital structure of Fonterra shares similarities with the NGC model. Members 
need to buy co-operative shares for each kilogram of milk solid delivered. Shares are sold 
at their “fair value”, which is estimated each year by Standard & Poor’s. The share value 
reflects  the  co-op  market  value,  which  in  2003/2004  equalled  NZ$4.38  per  share.  As 
opposed to having delivery shares, which in an NGC contribute to the capital needed by 
the co-op, Fonterra’s membership is open and share-owners must be dairy producers. 
Another interesting feature is the use of capital notes; this feature limits, and helps 
with planning of, capital outflow from the co-op. When members retire or quit production, 
Fonterra can choose to pay them in capital notes carrying, in 2002, a 7.48 percent interest 
rate.
5 The member can then either choose to keep the notes and recover the capital at 
expiration, or to cash them in immediately on the bond market. In either case, Fonterra 
 
 
Figure 2  Governance structure of Fonterra. 
Source: www.Fonterra.com Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon 
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has to pay the capital only at the expiration date of the note.
6 Finally, Fonterra can release 
redeemable preference shares, which are basically capital notes carrying a higher interest 
rate, and which are directly accessible to non–co-op members. This financial tool allows 
the co-op to improve access to capital, although to date no such non-voting shares have 
been released.  
The Fonterra co-operative model is interesting, since it borrows from the NGC model, 
the private sector model and traditional co-operative structures, making it a unique hybrid 
model whose performance will need to be evaluated over the long term. 
References 
Aaker, D. A. 1992. Strategic market management. 3rd ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Abdill, P. 2000. Evaluation of agri-food enterprises: Moody’s point of view. In Actes de 
colloque, les outils financiers au service du future, Centre de référence en agriculture 
et agroalimentaire du Québec, September. 
Baltazar, R., and M. R. Brooks. 2001. The governance of port devolution:A tale of two 
countries. Researh report, University of Dalhousie, Halifax, Nova Scotia. 
Boland, M., and D. Barton. 2002. Dakota Growers Pasta: Vertical integration in durum 
wheat and the pasta manufacturing industry. Kansas State University, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Arthur Capper Co-operative Center Case Study Series No. 
02-01, August. 
Daft, R. L. 1998. Organization theory and design. 3rd ed. New York: West Publishing 
Co. 
Dakota Growers. http://www.dakotagrowers.com/ 
Doyon, M. 2001. Structural change in the Canadian dairy industry and implications for 
the co-operatives. International Dairy Federation Bulletin 360/2001: 56-64. 
Fonterra. 2003. Co-operative Group Limited Investment Statement relating to an offer of 
Co-operative Shares, Peak Notes, Supply Redemption Rights, Capital Notes and 
Redeemable Preference Shares. February. 
http://www.fonterra.com/pdfs/Investment_Statement_17_02_2004.pdf) 
Fulton, M., and J. Gibbings. 2000. Canadian agricultural co-operatives: Critical success 
factors in the 21st Century. Prepared for Canadian Co-operative Association and le 
Conseil Canadien de la Coopération, October. 
Garoyan, L. 1991. Review of dairy co-op issues in Ireland. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 73(4): 1292-1293. 
Goddard, H. 2002. Factors underlying the evolution of farm-related co-operatives in 
Alberta. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 50(4): 473-495 
Harte, L. N. 1994. Perspectives on the emergence of the co-op Plcs in the Irish dairy 
industry. Proceedings, Agricultural Economic Society, 1-19. 
O’Connor J., and G. Thompson. 2001. International trends in the structure of agricultural 
co-operatives. Report for the Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation 
(RIRDC), RIRDC Publication No 01/06, January. Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues  M. Doyon 
 
 
      21 
Pitts, E. 2001. Structural change in the Irish dairy industry: Growth in scale, new methods 
of financing and internationalisation. International Dairy Federation Bulletin 
360/2001: 65-70 
Spear, R. 2001. Globalisation et stratégies des co-operatives. In Les Holdings coopératifs, 
Évolution ou transformation définitive? De Boeck University, p.115-138. 
Thibault, A., and R. Dupuis. 2003. Structures coopératives alternatives de l’industrie 
bioalimentaire: Une analyse préliminaire. International Biofoods Institute, Research 
Report, Montreal. 
Van Bekkum, O.-F. et al. 1997. L’Évolution des coopératives agricoles dans l’Union 
européenne, tendances et questions-clés à l’aube du 21ième siècle. The Netherlands 
Institute for Co-operative Entrepreneurship (NICE). 
Westgren, R. E. 1994. Reconfiguration of the Coopérative Fédérée de Québec for new 
strategic directions. In Competitive strategy analysis for agricultural marketing co-
operatives. Westview Press. 
 
                                                             
Endnotes 
1 The three important differences between co-operatives and other types of businesses are 
1) the  orientation  toward  services  to  members  rather  than  profit  maximization; 
2) surpluses  are  shared  according  to  usage  links  rather  than  according  to  capital 
ownership; and 3) one member, one vote rule, with the board of directors democratically 
elected  among  members.  Seven  co-operative  principles  also  exist.  This  analysis  will 
however focus only on the first of these, open membership. 
2 An example not discussed would be the Coopérative Fédérée de Québec, which shares 
ownership of Olymel with the Société Générale de Financement. 
3 Shares are currently exchanged through two private brokers. The process that will enable 
the company to be listed on the stock exchange has not yet been completed. 
4 The shareholders council can call a poll for reasons such as election of a councillor to 
represent  a  ward  (geographical  area  within  NZ),  election  of  a  director,  removal  of  a 
director,  or  election  of  the  six  shareholders  members  of  the  directors’  remuneration 
committee. 
5 If a producer reduces production but does not retire, he or she can choose to receive 
either capital notes or supply-redemption rights. The latter can be exchanged anytime on a 
one-for-one basis for co-operative shares, even if their price has increased. The supply-
redemption right targets temporary supply-reduction situations. 
6 In Canada, poor planning of capital outflow from retiring members contributed to capital 
problems at the time of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool’s transformation into a co-op PLC. 